David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Acta Analytica 24 (24):175--194 (2000)
In this paper we examine Lewis's attempts to provide an epistemology of modality and we argue that he fails to provide an account that properly weds his metaphysics with an epistemology that explains the knowledge of modality that both he and his critics grant. We argue that neither the appeals to acceptable paraphrases of ordinary modal discourse nor parallels with Platonistic theories of mathematics suffice. We conclude that no proper epistemology for modal realism has been provided and that one is needed.
|Keywords||Epistemology, Modality, Platonism, Realism|
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Citations of this work BETA
Sandy Berkovski (2011). Lewis' Reduction of Modality. Acta Analytica 26 (2):95-114.
Stephen McLeod (2005). Modal Epistemology. Philosophical Books 46 (3):235-245.
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