Empirical adequacy: A partial structures approach

Based on da Costa's and French's notions of partial structures and pragmatic truth, this paper examines two possible characterizations of the concept of empirical adequacy, one depending on the notion of partial isomorphism, the other on the hierarchy of partial models of phenomena, and both compatible with an empiricist view. These formulations can then be employed to illuminate certain aspects of scientific practice.
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DOI 10.1016/S0039-3681(97)00012-5
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References found in this work BETA
Stephen M. Downes (1992). The Importance of Models in Theorizing: A Deflationary Semantic View. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:142 - 153.
Jim Woodward (1989). Data and Phenomena. Synthese 79 (3):393 - 472.

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Citations of this work BETA
Rasmus Grønfeldt Winther (2012). Interweaving Categories: Styles, Paradigms, and Models. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (4):628-639.
Steven French & James Ladyman (1999). Reinflating the Semantic Approach. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 13 (2):103 – 121.
Mauricio Suárez & Nancy Cartwright (2007). Theories: Tools Versus Models. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 39 (1):62-81.

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