Empiricism, scientific change and mathematical change

The aim of this paper is to provide a unified account of scientific and mathematical change in a thoroughly empiricist setting. After providing a formal modelling in terms of embedding, and criticising it for being too restrictive, a second modelling is advanced. It generalises the first, providing a more open-ended pattern of theory development, and is articulated in terms of da Costa and French's partial structures approach. The crucial component of scientific and mathematical change is spelled out in terms of partial embeddings. Finally, an application of this second pattern is made, with the examination of the early formulation of set theory (in particular, the works of Cantor, Zermelo and Skolem).
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DOI 10.1016/S0039-3681(99)00037-0
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K. R. Popper (1966). Conjectures and Refutations. Les Etudes Philosophiques 21 (3):431-434.

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