Principia 5 (1-2):99-124 (2010)
|Abstract||In this paper, I develop a new defense of logicism: one that combines logicism and nominalism. First, I defend the logicist approach from recent criticisms; in particular from the charge that a cruciai principie in the logicist reconstruction of arithmetic, Hume's Principle, is not analytic. In order to do that, I argue, it is crucial to understand the overall logicist approach as a nominalist view. I then indicate a way of extending the nominalist logicist approach beyond arithmetic. Finally, I argue that a nominalist can use the resulting approach to provide a nominalization strategy for mathematics. In this way, mathematical structures can be introduced without ontological costs. And so, if this proposal is correct, we can say that ultimately all the nominalist needs is logic (and, rather loosely, ali the logicist needs is nominalism)|
|Keywords||Frege Hume's principle analyticity Russell nominalism logicism|
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