Modalism and Logical Pluralism

Mind 118 (470):295-321 (2009)
Abstract
Logical pluralism is the view according to which there is more than one relation of logical consequence, even within a given language. A recent articulation of this view has been developed in terms of quantification over different cases: classical logic emerges from consistent and complete cases; constructive logic from consistent and incomplete cases, and paraconsistent logic from inconsistent and complete cases. We argue that this formulation causes pluralism to collapse into either logical nihilism or logical universalism. In its place, we propose a modalist account of logical pluralism that is independently well motivated and that avoids these collapses
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Citations of this work BETA
Owen Griffiths (2013). Problems for Logical Pluralism. History and Philosophy of Logic 34 (2):170 - 182.
Otávio Bueno (2012). Styles of Reasoning: A Pluralist View. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (4):657-665.
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