Psychoanalytic Facts as Unintended Institutional Facts

Philosophy of the Social Sciences 42 (2):239-269 (2012)
We present an inference to the best explanation of the immense cultural success of Freudian psychoanalysis as a hermeneutic method. We argue that an account of psychoanalytic facts as products of unintended declarative speech acts explains this phenomenon. Our argument connects diverse, seemingly independent characteristics of psychoanalysis that have been independently confirmed, and applies key features of John Searle’s and Eerik Lagerspetz’s theory of institutional facts to the psychoanalytic edifice. We conclude with a brief defence of the institutional approach against more contentious social constructivist approaches to science and psychoanalysis
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1177/0048393111399099
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 16,707
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Emma Tieffenbach (2010). Searle and Menger on Money. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 40 (2):191-212.
A. Morton (2001). Lore-Abiding People. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 32 (3):601-606.
J. R. Lucas (1958). On Not Worshipping Facts. Philosophical Quarterly 8 (31):144-156.
Mark Jago & Stephen Barker (2012). Being Positive About Negative Facts. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (1):117-138.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

29 ( #108,149 of 1,726,249 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

2 ( #289,836 of 1,726,249 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.