Baker on the psychological account of personal identity

Acta Analytica 24 (3):197-209 (2009)
Abstract
Lynne Rudder Baker’s Constitution View of human persons has come under much recent scrutiny. Baker argues that each human person is constituted by, but not identical to, a human animal. Much of the critical discussion of Baker’s Constitution View has focused upon this aspect of her account. Less has been said about the positive diachronic account of personal identity offered by Baker. Baker argues that it is sameness of what she labels ‘first-person perspective’ that is essential to understanding personal identity over time . Baker claims that her account avoids the commitment to indeterminacy of personal identity entailed by the psychological account. Further, the psychological account, but not her account, is plagued by what Baker labels the ‘duplication problem’. In the end, I argue that neither of these considerations forces us to renounce the psychological account and adopt Baker’s favored account.
Keywords Personal identity  Psychological account  Lynne Rudder Baker  First-person perspective
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References found in this work BETA
Lynne Rudder Baker (1999). What Am I? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):151 - 159.
Lynne Rudder Baker (1999). What Am I? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):151-159.

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