David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Dialectica 63 (3):325-332 (2009)
Nishi Shah has argued that the norm of truth is a prescriptive norm which regulates doxastic deliberation. Also, the acceptance of the norm of truth explains why belief is subject to norms of evidence. Steglich-Petersen pointed out that the norm of truth cannot be prescriptive because it cannot be broken deliberatively. More recently, Pascal Engel suggested that both the norms of truth and evidence are deliberately violated in cases of epistemic akrasia. The akratic agent accepts these norms but in some cases he is not motivated by them. In this paper I will argue that Shah cannot use Engel's suggestion because, given his definition of doxastic deliberation, epistemic akrasia is impossible in the context of deliberation about belief. Furthermore, epistemic akrasia is in conflict with the phenomenon of doxastic transparency that Shah tries to explain.
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References found in this work BETA
J. Adler (2002). Belief's Own Ethics. MIT Press.
Nishi Shah & J. David Velleman (2005). Doxastic Deliberation. Philosophical Review 114 (4):497 - 534.
Nishi Shah (2003). How Truth Governs Belief. Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.
Bernard A. O. Williams (1973). Problems of the Self. Cambridge University Press.
Kathrin Glüer & Åsa Wikforss (2009). Against Content Normativity. Mind 118 (469):31-70.
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