David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Biology and Philosophy 27 (1):1-27 (2012)
Adaptationists explain the evolution of religion from the cooperative effects of religious commitments, but which cooperation problem does religion evolve to solve? I focus on a class of symmetrical coordination problems for which there are two pure Nash equilibriums: (1) ALL COOPERATE, which is efficient but relies on full cooperation; (2) ALL DEFECT, which is inefficient but pays regardless of what others choose. Formal and experimental studies reveal that for such risky coordination problems, only the defection equilibrium is evolutionarily stable. The following makes sense of otherwise puzzling properties of religious cognition and cultures as features of cooperative designs that evolve to stabilise such risky exchange. The model is interesting because it explains lingering puzzles in the data on religion, and better integrates evolutionary theories of religion with recent, well-motivated models of cooperative niche construction
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Scott Atran & Ara Norenzayan (2004). Religion's Evolutionary Landscape: Counterintuition, Commitment, Compassion, Communion. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (6):713-730.
Michael Bacharach (2006). Beyond Individual Choice: Teams and Frames in Game Theory. Princeton University Press.
K. G. Binmore (2005). Natural Justice. Oxford University Press.
Ken Binmore (2008). Do Conventions Need to Be Common Knowledge? Topoi 27 (1-2):17-27.
Citations of this work BETA
Ronald Fischer, Rohan Callander, Paul Reddish & Joseph Bulbulia (2013). How Do Rituals Affect Cooperation? Human Nature 24 (2):115-125.
Similar books and articles
Wim J. van der Steen (2000). Niche Construction: A Pervasive Force in Evolution? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (1):162-163.
Federica Alberti, Experimental Evidence of the Emergence of Aesthetic Rules in Pure Coordination Games.
Subhadip Chakrabarti, Robert P. Gilles & Emiliya A. Lazarova (2011). Strategic Behavior Under Partial Cooperation. Theory and Decision 71 (2):175-193.
Michele Bernasconi & Matteo Galizzi (2010). Network Formation in Repeated Interactions: Experimental Evidence on Dynamic Behaviour. [REVIEW] Mind and Society 9 (2):193-228.
Kevin N. Laland, John Odling-Smee & Marcus W. Feldman (2000). Niche Construction Earns its Keep. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (1):164-172.
Thomas Schael (1998). The Relevance of Computer Supported Cooperative Work for Advanced Manufacturing. AI and Society 12 (1-2):38-47.
Benoît Dubreuil (2010). Paleolithic Public Goods Games: Why Human Culture and Cooperation Did Not Evolve in One Step. Biology and Philosophy 25 (1):53-73.
Huaping Wang & Xiaoming Sheng (2007). Cooperative Naturalism. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 2 (4):601 - 613.
Maarten C. W. Janssen (2003). Coordination and Cooperation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (2):165-166.
Nicholas Almendares & Dimitri Landa (2007). Strategic Coordination and the Law. Law and Philosophy 26 (5):501-529.
Sandra Scarr (1994). Ethical Problems in Research on Risky Behaviors and Risky Populations. Ethics and Behavior 4 (2):147 – 155.
Wang Huaping & Sheng Xiaoming (2007). Cooperative Naturalism. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 2 (4):601-613.
Eric Saidel (2000). The Compound Interest Effect: Why Cultural Evolution is Not Niche Construction. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (1):158-159.
Added to index2011-10-25
Total downloads8 ( #179,168 of 1,102,046 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #306,606 of 1,102,046 )
How can I increase my downloads?