¿Qué es un individuo concreto?

Theoria 1 (1):121-128 (1985)
Abstract
The paper investigates the problems whether a concrete individual can be defined as a set or be characterized by an abstract theory. In particular, Jesês Mosterín’s objection to a theory of things proposed by the present author is discussed. Also, the view of scientific theories held by Sneed, and adopted by Mosterln, is analyzed. It is concluded that any adequate description of a concrete individual calls for more than a mathematical formalism
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