The logic of thought experiments

Synthese 106 (2):227 - 240 (1996)
In this paper I argue that (at least many) philosophical thought experiments are unreliable. But I argue that this notion of unreliability has to be understood relative to the goal of thought experiments as knowledge producing. And relative to that goal many thought experiments in science are just as unreliable. But in fact thought experiments in science play a varied role and I will suggest that knowledge production is a goal only under quite limited circumstances. I defend the view that these circumstances can (sometimes) arise in philosophy as well.
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DOI 10.1007/BF00413701
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References found in this work BETA
Judith Jarvis Thomson (1971). A Defense of Abortion. Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (1):47-66.

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Citations of this work BETA
Marco Buzzoni (2007). Zum Verhältnis Zwischen Experiment Und Gedankenexperiment in den Naturwissenschaften. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 38 (2):219 - 237.

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