Cohabitation, stuff and intermittent existence

Mind 89 (355):391-405 (1980)
I will try to establish that there are cases in which an ordinary material object exists intermittently. Afterwards there will be a few words about the consequences of acknowledging such cases, but what is of more interest, perhaps, is the route by which the conclusion is reached. When deciding among competing descriptions of the cases considered, I have tried to reduce to a minimum the role of intuitive judgement, and I have based several arguments on 'metaphysical principles'. These principles are not invoked uncritically. Indeed, I give what I think are all but decisive arguments in support of two such principles, neither of which is wholly uncontroversial: (1) a material object cannot be identified with the stuff of which it is composed, and (2) different material objects cannot be simultaneously embodied within just the same matter.
Keywords intermittent existence  coinciding objects  stuff  material constitution
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DOI 10.1093/mind/LXXXIX.355.391
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Mark Bajakian (2011). How to Count People. Philosophical Studies 154 (2):185 - 204.
Kit Fine (2008). I—Kit Fine: Coincidence and Form. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 82 (1):101-118.

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