Online research in philosophy

It seems that hope springs eternal for the cherished idea that norms (or normativeprinciples) explain actions or regularities in actions. But it also seems thatthere are many ways of going wrong when taking norms and normative principlesas explanatory. The author argues that neither norms nor normative principles—insofar as they are the sort of things with normative force—is explanatoryof what is done. He considers the matter using both erotetic and ontic models ofexplanation. He further considers various understandings of norms. Key Words: explanation • norms • social science • rationality.

Our critics confuse the role normative ethical theory can take in business ethics. We argue that as a practical discipline, business ethics must focus on norms, not the theories from which the norms derive. It is true that our original work is defective, but not in its form, but in its neglect of contemporary advances in feminist ethics.

Numerous universal standards have been proposed to provide ethical guidance for the actions of business. The result has been a confusing mix of standards and their defenses. Thus, there is widespread recognition that business requires a common framework to provide ethical guidance. One of the most prominent conceptual frameworks recently offered, which addresses issues of international business ethics, is that of integrative social contracts theory (ISCT) developed by Thomas Donaldson and Thomas Dunfee. By integrating normative and empirical matters, and drawing on the concepts of social contracts and hypernorms, ISCT seeks to provide a workable, comprehensive theory of business ethics. In this article I argue that, in fact, ISCT offers two different views of hypemorms and the theoretical structure surrounding them. A Principlist View that understands hypernorms as the most general, universal moral principles that hold moral sway over all microsocial contracts. A Contextualist View is that hypernorms are not special, additional norms, but refer to a certain status that the most general norms or principles of each community achieve that are part of a convergence with the norms of other societies. I maintain that the Contextualist View offers a plausible view of ISCT while avoiding many of the criticisms that have been made against the Principlist interpretation of ISCT. Further, the Contextualist View suggests other areas in which ISCT needs further development, such as in the area of human rights which I also briefly explore.

Bicchieri (The grammar of society: The nature and dynamics of norms, 2006, xi) presents a formal analysis of norms that answers the questions of “when, how, and to what degree” norms affect human behavior in the play of games. The purpose of this paper is to apply a variation of the Bicchieri norms analysis to generate a model of norms-based play of the traditional deterrence game (Zagare and Kilgour, Int Stud Q 37:1–27, 1993; Morrow, Game theory for political scientists, 1994), the paradigmatic model of conflict initiation in International Relations. The deterrence game is modeled here as a sequential decision problem. As such, our analysis is an adaptation of Bicchieri’s game-theoretic formalization of norms to what we will call the norms account of the game. We find that the standard account of the traditional deterrence game is a special case of the norms account of the game. We also show that the adaptation of Bicchieri’s analysis of social norms yields new and interesting claims regarding when, how, and to what degree norms operate as a constraint on risk-related behavior in the traditional deterrence game. Moreover, we discuss how the results of the model provide testable propositions of relevance to the role of norms in international interactions.

Extant social contracts, deriving from communities of individuals, constitute a significant source of ethical norms in business. When found consistent with general ethical theories through the application of a fiItering test, these real social contracts generate prima facie duties of compliance on the part of those who expressly or impliedly consent to the terms of the social contract, and also on the part of those who take advantage of the instrumental value of the social contracts. Businesspeople typically participate in multiple communities and, as a consequence, encounter conflicting ethical norms. Priority rules can be devised to resolve such conflicts. The framework of extant social contracts merges normative and theoretical research in business ethics and specifies a domain for empirical studies.

This article addresses several issues raised by Nichols, Gintis, and Skyrms and Zollman in their comments on my book, The Grammar of Society: The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms . In particular, I explore the relation between social and personal norms, what an adequate game-theoretic representation of norms should be, and what models of norms emergence should tell us about the formation of normative expectations.

Integrative social contracts theory (ISCT) uses empirical methods to develop guidelines for international business ethics. This article criticizes ISCT in terms of the way people actually think about contracts and agreements around the globe. Differences in orientations to communications context, moral reasoning, and institutional and structural conditions make the identification of authentic norms, hypernorms, and relevant communities problematic. The difficulties of the empirical methods suggest recourse to more traditional theoretical approaches for the identification of hypernorms as well as a stronger test for the compatibility of authentic norms with hypernorms.

Social contract theory offers a powerful method and metaphor for the study of organizational ethics. This paper considers the variant of the social contract that has arguably gained the most attention among business ethicists: integrative social contracts theory or ISCT [Donaldson and Dunfee: 1999, Ties That Bind (Harvard Business School Press, Boston)]. A core precept of ISCT - that consent to membership in an organization entails obligations to follow the norms of that organization, subject to the moral minimums of basic human rights - is a reasonable and appealing notion. One potential challenge for those attempting to apply this idea, however, lies in the dynamic nature of social norms. Organizational norms evolve, often through the conscious efforts of community members and leaders. As currently formulated, ISCT offers a framework that under-appreciates the evolving nature of moral norms. In this paper, we extend ISCT by considering the circumstances under which the terms of and parties to social contracts change. We also consider a number of principles that should be considered as the terms and parties to organizational social contracts change.

Applying social contract theory to business ethics is a relatively new idea, and perhaps nobody has pursued this direction better than Thomas Donaldson and Thomas W. Dunfee. Their "Integrative Social Contracts Theory" manages to combine culturally sensitive decision making capacities with trans-cultural norms by setting up a layered system of social contracts. Lurking behind their work is a concern with the problems of relativism. They hope to alleviate these problems by introducing three concepts important to the ISCT: "authentic norms," which clarify culturally specific norms, "priority rules," which determine the rules of engagement when authentic norms clash, and "hypernorms," which measure the value of authentic norms against a thin set of universally upheld values. This paper traces the genealogy of these hypernorms and challenges their value for the ISCT. It argues that well-conceived priority rules can do everything hypernorms can, and can do so more simply.

I propose that the emphasis on "authentic" norms in the ISCT literature does not encompass the possibility of community norms that facilitate and maintain corrupt behavior. To fill this gap, I build on the normalization of corruption literature to present a typology of community norms that distinguishes between authentic, behavioral, and aspirational norm types as well as between illegitimate, authentic norms and illegitimate, behavioral norms. By refining the terminology used to evaluate community norms, I propose that ISCT can be more easily applied to cases of systemic corruption.