Five Theses on De Re States and Attitudes

In Joseph Almog & Paolo Leonardi (eds.), The Philosophy of David Kaplan. Oxford University Press 246--324 (2009)
I shall propose five theses on de re states and attitudes. To be a de re state or attitude is to bear a peculiarly direct epistemic and representational relation to a particular referent in perception or thought. I will not dress this bare statement here. The fifth thesis tries to be less coarse. The first four explicate and restrict context- bound, singular, empirical representation, which constitutes a significant and central type of de re state or attitude.
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Santiago Echeverri (2016). Object Files, Properties, and Perceptual Content. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (2):283-307.
Luke Manning (2015). No Identity Without an Entity. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (1):279-305.
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Ben Phillips (2016). Contextualism About Object-Seeing. Philosophical Studies 173 (9):2377-2396.

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