David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Noûs 44 (3):433-450 (2010)
There are three general ways to approach reconciliation: from the side of nonfactualism, from the side of deflationism, or from both sides at once. To approach reconciliation from a given side, as I will use the expression, just means to attend in the first instance to the details of that side’s position. (It will be important to keep in mind that the success of an approach from one side may ultimately require concessions from the other side.) The only attempts at reconciliation in the literature of which I am aware fall in to the first of these three categories. Such writers argue that the tension between our –isms can be resolved by paying sufficiently close attention to the nature of nonfactualism. While I have nothing against this approach in principle, I do have reservations about the particular proposals that have been made in its pursuit. The first section of the present paper briefly develops a line of objection against one such proposal, in order to motivate the approach to reconciliation from the side of deflationism. In section two, I argue that the deflationist can and should reject the inference from (2) to (3) above. Section three addresses a special problem of reconciliation for the nonfactu- alist who continues to use the discourse she takes to be factually defective. By paying close attention to the details of deflationism about reference, I show how a deflationist about truth might avoid this problem. I conclude that deflationism can be developed in a way that renders it compatible with nonfactualism
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References found in this work BETA
B. Armour-Garb & J. C. Beall (2005). Deflationary Truth. Open Court Press.
Paul A. Boghossian (1990). The Status of Content. Philosophical Review 99 (2):157-84.
Michael A. E. Dummett (1978). Truth and Other Enigmas. Harvard University Press.
Hartry Field (1994). Disquotational Truth and Factually Defective Discourse. Philosophical Review 103 (3):405-452.
Citations of this work BETA
Alexis Burgess (2011). Mainstream Semantics + Deflationary Truth. Linguistics and Philosophy 34 (5):397-410.
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