Mind-body causation and explanatory practice

In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press (1993)
Argument for Epiphenomenalism [I]: (A) Mental event-tokens are identical with physical event-tokens. (B) The causal powers of a physical event are determined only by its physical properties; and (C) mental properties are not reducible to physical properties.
Keywords Body  Causation  Mind
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William Lycan (2009). Giving Dualism its Due. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):551-563.
Ned Block (2003). Do Causal Powers Drain Away. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (1):133-150.
Richard Corry (2013). Emerging From the Causal Drain. Philosophical Studies 165 (1):29-47.

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