Negative Existentials in Metaphysical Debate

Metaphilosophy 43 (3):221-234 (2012)
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Abstract

There are statements of the form “There are no Fs” that we would like to count as true, yet it is hard to see how they could be true. The relevant Fs are general terms that we take to be semantically fundamental or primitive, especially those native to metaphysical discourse. A case can be made the problem is no less difficult than the corresponding problem for singular terms.

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Alexis Burgess
Pomona College

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References found in this work

Naming and Necessity: Lectures Given to the Princeton University Philosophy Colloquium.Saul A. Kripke - 1980 - Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Edited by Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Critica 17 (49):69-71.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.
Is there a fundamental level?Jonathan Schaffer - 2003 - Noûs 37 (3):498–517.

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