Negative Existentials in Metaphysical Debate

Metaphilosophy 43 (3):221-234 (2012)
Abstract
There are statements of the form “There are no Fs” that we would like to count as true, yet it is hard to see how they could be true (at least, operating within the semantic framework of structured propositions). The relevant Fs are general terms that we take to be semantically fundamental or primitive, especially those native to <span class='Hi'>metaphysical</span> discourse. A case can be made the problem is no less difficult than the corresponding problem for singular terms.
Keywords necessarily uninstantiated properties  meta‐ontology  negative existentials
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9973.2012.01743.x
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References found in this work BETA
Saul Kripke (2010). Naming and Necessity. In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge 431-433.

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