Negative Existentials in Metaphysical Debate

Metaphilosophy 43 (3):221-234 (2012)
There are statements of the form “There are no Fs” that we would like to count as true, yet it is hard to see how they could be true (at least, operating within the semantic framework of structured propositions). The relevant Fs are general terms that we take to be semantically fundamental or primitive, especially those native to metaphysical discourse. A case can be made the problem is no less difficult than the corresponding problem for singular terms
Keywords necessarily uninstantiated properties  meta‐ontology  negative existentials
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    David Braun (1993). Empty Names. Noûs 27 (4):449-469.
    Stuart Brock (2004). The Ubiquitous Problem of Empty Names. Journal of Philosophy 101 (6):277 - 298.

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