No requirement of relevance

In Stewart Shapiro (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic. Oxford University Press. pp. 727--750 (2005)
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Abstract

There are schools of logicians who claim that an argument is not valid unless the conclusion is relevant to the premises. In particular, relevance logicians reject the classical theses that anything follows from a contradiction and that a logical truth follows from everything. This chapter critically evaluates several different motivations for relevance logic, and several systems of relevance logic, finding them all wanting.

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John Burgess
Princeton University

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