Perceptual entitlement

Abstract
The paper develops a conception of epistemic warrant as applied to perceptual belief, called entitlement, that does not require the warranted individual to be capable of understanding the warrant. The conception is situated within an account of animal perception and unsophisticated perceptual belief. It characterizes entitlement as fulfillment of an epistemic norm that is apriori associated with a certain representational function that can be known apriori to be a function of perception. The paper connects anti-individualism, a thesis about the nature of mental states, and perceptual entitlement. It presents an argument that explains the objectivity and validity of perceptual entitlement partly in terms of the nature of perceptual states-hence the nature of perceptual beliefs, which are constitutively associated with perceptual states. The paper discusses ways that an individual can be entitled to perceptual belief through its connection to perception, and ways that entitlement to perceptual belief can be undermined
Keywords Belief  Entitlement  Epistemology  Individualism  Perception
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John McDowell (2011). Tyler Burge on Disjunctivism. Philosophical Explorations 13 (3):243-255.
Tyler Burge (2011). Disjunctivism Again. Philosophical Explorations 14 (1):43-80.
Roger White (2006). Problems for Dogmatism. Philosophical Studies 131 (3):525--57.

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