David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):503-48 (2003)
The paper develops a conception of epistemic warrant as applied to perceptual belief, called "entitlement", that does not require the warranted individual to be capable of understanding the warrant. The conception is situated within an account of animal perception and unsophisticated perceptual belief. It characterizes entitlement as fulfillment of an epistemic norm that is apriori associated with a certain representational function that can be known apriori to be a function of perception. The paper connects anti-individualism, a thesis about the nature of mental states, and perceptual entitlement. It presents an argument that explains the objectivity and validity of perceptual entitlement partly in terms of the nature of perceptual states–hence the nature of perceptual beliefs, which are constitutively associated with perceptual states. The paper discusses ways that an individual can be entitled to perceptual belief through its connection to perception, and ways that entitlement to perceptual belief can be undermined.
|Keywords||entitlement warrant perceptual belief anti-individualism|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
James Pryor (2004). What's Wrong with Moore's Argument? Philosophical Issues 14 (1):349–378.
Peter J. Graham (2012). Epistemic Entitlement. Noûs 46 (3):449-482.
John McDowell (2011). Tyler Burge on Disjunctivism. Philosophical Explorations 13 (3):243-255.
Susanna Schellenberg (2014). The Epistemic Force of Perceptual Experience. Philosophical Studies 170 (1):87-100.
John Bengson, Marc A. Moffett & Jennifer C. Wright (2009). The Folk on Knowing How. Philosophical Studies 142 (3):387–401.
Similar books and articles
Yuval Avnur (2012). Mere Faith and Entitlement. Synthese 189 (2):297-315.
Jack C. Lyons (2005). Perceptual Belief and Nonexperiential Looks. Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):237-256.
Hamid Vahid (2011). The Concept of Entitlement and its Epistemic Relevance. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (3):380-399.
Crispin Wright & Martin Davies (2004). On Epistemic Entitlement. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78:167-245.
B. C. Postow (1988). Bookreviews. Annals of Science 45 (6):647-670.
Albert Casullo (2007). What is Entitlement? Acta Analytica 22 (4):267 - 279.
Hamid Vahid (2012). Burge on Perceptual Entitlement. Metaphilosophy 43 (3):187-203.
Chris Tucker (2009). Perceptual Justification and Warrant by Default. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87: 445-63 87 (3):445-63.
Nicholas Silins (2012). Explaining Perceptual Entitlement. Erkenntnis 76 (2):243-261.
Tyler Burge (2003). Perceptual Entitlement. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):503-548.
Added to index2009-09-11
Total downloads304 ( #6,776 of 1,863,378 )
Recent downloads (6 months)26 ( #29,467 of 1,863,378 )
How can I increase my downloads?