Perceptual objectivity

Philosophical Review 118 (3):285-324 (2009)
Abstract
A central preoccupation of philosophy in the twentieth century was to determine constitutive conditions under which accurate (objective) empirical representation of the macrophysical environment is possible. A view that dominated attitudes on this project maintained that an individual cannot empirically represent a physical subject matter as having specific physical characteristics unless the individual can represent some constitutive conditions under which such representation is possible. The version of this view that dominated the century's second half maintained that objective empirical representation of the physical environment requires the individual to be able to supplement this representation with representation of general constitutive features of objectivity. This essay criticizes instances of this version in P. F. Strawson and Quine. It maintains that all versions of the position postulate conditions on objective empirical representation that are more intellectual than are warranted. Such views leave it doubtful that animals and human infants perceptually represent elements in the physical environment. By appeal to common sense and to empirical perceptual psychology, this essay argues that unaided perception yields objective representation of the macrophysical environment. It does so in prelinguistic animals, even in animals that almost surely lack propositional attitudes. The essay concludes with explications of nondeflationary conceptions of representation and perception. It distinguishes nonperceptual sensing from perceptual representation and explicates perceptual representation as a type of objective sensory representation. Objectivity is marked by perceptual constancies. Representation is marked by a nontrivial role for veridicality conditions in explanations of the relevant states. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us Digg Reddit Technorati What's this?
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 11,404
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA
Ned Block (2010). Attention and Mental Paint1. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):23-63.
Ned Block (2013). The Grain of Vision and the Grain of Attention. Thought, A Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):170-184.
Ian Phillips (2013). Afterimages and Sensation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):417-453.
Matthew Fulkerson (2011). The Unity of Haptic Touch. Philosophical Psychology 24 (4):493 - 516.

View all 8 citations

Similar books and articles
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-07-19

Total downloads

513 ( #287 of 1,102,989 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

10 ( #21,031 of 1,102,989 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.