Preserving the principle of one object to a place: A novel account of the relations among objects, sorts, sortals, and persistence conditions

The article provides a novel, conservative account of material constitution, one that employs sortal essentialism and a theory of dominant sortals. It avoids coinciding objects, temporal parts, relativizations of identity, mereological essentialism, anti-essentialism, denials of the reality of the objects of our ordinary ontology, and other radical departures from the metaphysic implicit in ordinary ways of thinking. Defenses of the account against important objections are found in Burke 1997, 2003, and 2004, as well as in the often neglected six paragraphs that conclude section V of this article.
Keywords sortal essentialism  sortals  persistence  identity
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DOI 10.2307/2108583
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Nikk Effingham & Jon Robson (2007). A Mereological Challenge to Endurantism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (4):633 – 640.
Nikk Effingham (2010). Mereological Explanation and Time Travel. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (2):333-345.

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