Quine, analyticity and philosophy of mathematics

Philosophical Quarterly 54 (214):38–55 (2004)
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Abstract

Quine correctly argues that Carnap's distinction between internal and external questions rests on a distinction between analytic and synthetic, which Quine rejects. I argue that Quine needs something like Carnap's distinction to enable him to explain the obviousness of elementary mathematics, while at the same time continuing to maintain as he does that the ultimate ground for holding mathematics to be a body of truths lies in the contribution that mathematics makes to our overall scientific theory of the world. Quine's arguments against the analytic/synthetic distinction, even if fully accepted, still leave room for a notion of pragmatic analyticity sufficient for the indicated purpose

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John Burgess
Princeton University

Citations of this work

Change of Logic, Change of Meaning.Jared Warren - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (2):421-442.
Philosophy of mathematics.Leon Horsten - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Logical Conventionalism.Jared Warren - forthcoming - In Elke Brendel, Massimiliano Carrara, Ole Hjortland, Gil Sagi, Gila Sher, Florian Steinberger & Filippo Ferrari (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Logic. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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References found in this work

Two Dogmas of Empiricism.Willard V. O. Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.
In defense of a dogma.H. P. Grice & P. F. Strawson - 1956 - Philosophical Review 65 (2):141-158.
On Carnap’s Views on Ontology.Willard van Orman Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Studies 2 (5):65--72.
In defense of a dogma.H. Paul Grice & P. F. Strawson - 1956 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophical Review. Routledge. pp. 141 - 158.
Review of V erbal Behavior. [REVIEW]Noam Chomsky - 1959 - Language 35 (1):26--58.

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