David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Quarterly 54 (214):38–55 (2004)
Quine correctly argues that Carnap's distinction between internal and external questions rests on a distinction between analytic and synthetic, which Quine rejects. I argue that Quine needs something like Carnap's distinction to enable him to explain the obviousness of elementary mathematics, while at the same time continuing to maintain as he does that the ultimate ground for holding mathematics to be a body of truths lies in the contribution that mathematics makes to our overall scientific theory of the world. Quine's arguments against the analytic/synthetic distinction, even if fully accepted, still leave room for a notion of pragmatic analyticity sufficient for the indicated purpose
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References found in this work BETA
H. P. Grice & P. F. Strawson (1956). In Defense of a Dogma. Philosophical Review 65 (2):141-158.
H. Paul Grice & P. F. Strawson (2010). In Defense of a Dogma. In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Arguing About Language. Routledge. 141 - 158.
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Citations of this work BETA
Jack Arnold & Stewart Shapiro (2007). Where in the (World Wide) Web of Belief is the Law of Non-Contradiction? Noûs 41 (2):276–297.
Nathaniel Jason Goldberg (2009). Historicism, Entrenchment, and Conventionalism. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 40 (2):259 - 276.
Kevin Scharp (forthcoming). Truth, Revenge, and Internalizability. Erkenntnis:1-49.
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