The Nature of Sensations in Reid

History of Philosophy Quarterly 22 (3):221 - 238 (2005)
For Reid, sensations do not enter into the analysis of perception proper. Instead they “intervene” between the effects of bodily qualities on our sense organs and our perception of those qualities (Inq VI xxi, 174).1 The question addressed in this essay is: What sort of thing does Reid take this interloper to be?2 The answer defended is that sensations are reflexive mental acts, i.e., acts which take themselves as objects.
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DOI 10.2307/27745026
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Keith Lehrer (2008). Consciousness AND REGRESS. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 6 (1):45-57.

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