Synthese 138 (2):261 - 287 (2004)
|Abstract||The Newcomb problem is analysed here as a type of common cause problem. In relation to such problems, if you take the dominated option your expected outcome will be good and if you take the dominant option your expected outcome will be not so good. As is explained, however, these arenot conventional conditional expected outcomes but `conditional evidence expected outcomes' and while in the deliberation process, the evidence on which they are based is only hypothetical evidence.Conventional conditional expected outcomes are more sensitive to your current epistemic state in that they are based purely on actual evidence which is available to you during the deliberation process. So although they are conditional on a certain act being performed, they are not based on evidence that you would have only if that act is performed. Moreover, for any given epistemic state during the deliberation process, your conventional conditional expected outcome for the dominant option will be better than that for the dominated option. The principle of dominance is thus in perfect harmony with the conventional conditional expected outcomes. In relation to the Newcomb problem then, the evidence unequivocally supports two-boxing as the rational option. Yet what is advanced here is not simply a two-boxing strategy. To see why, two stages to the problem need to be recognised. The first stage is that which occurs before the information used by the predictor in making his predictions has been gained. The second stage is after this point. Provided that you are still in the first stage, you have an opportunity to influence whether or not the predictor places the $1m in the opaque box. To maximise the probability that it is, you need to commit yourself to one-boxing.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
John L. Pollock (2010). A Resource-Bounded Agent Addresses the Newcomb Problem. Synthese 176 (1):57 - 82.
Paul Weirich (1986). Decisions in Dynamic Settings. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1986:438 - 449.
Louis Marinoff (1996). How Braess' Paradox Solves Newcomb's Problem: Not! International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 10 (3):217 – 237.
A. D. Irvine (1993). How Braess' Paradox Solves Newcomb's Problem. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7 (2):141 – 160.
Stephen Maitzen & Garnett Wilson (2003). Newcomb's Hidden Regress. Theory and Decision 54 (2):151-162.
Jordan Howard Sobel (1991). Some Versions of Newcomb's Problem Are Prisoners' Dilemmas. Synthese 86 (2):197 - 208.
Simon Burgess (2012). Newcomb's Problem and its Conditional Evidence: A Common Cause of Confusion. Synthese 184 (3):319-339.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads18 ( #74,535 of 722,929 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,087 of 722,929 )
How can I increase my downloads?