The problem with Reid's direct realism

Philosophical Quarterly 52 (209):457-477 (2002)
There is a problem about the compatibility of Reid's commitment to both a sign theory of sensations and also direct realism. I show that Reid is committed to three different senses of the claim that mind independent bodies and their qualities are among the immediate objects of perception, and I then argue that Reid's sign theory conflicts with one of these. I conclude by advocating one proposal for reconciling Reid's claims, deferring a thorough development and defence of the proposal to another paper
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References found in this work BETA
Phillip D. Cummins (1974). Reid's Realism. Journal of the History of Philosophy 12 (3):317-340.

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Citations of this work BETA
Walter Horn (2010). Reid and Hall on Perceptual Relativity and Error. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 8 (2):115-145.
Jake Quilty-Dunn (2013). Was Reid a Direct Realist? British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (2):302 - 323.
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