Abstract

This dissertation develops and defends an interpretation of Thomas Reid's direct realism, a view Reid expresses in his own words as follows: "something which is extended and solid...is the immediate object of my touch and sight. And this object I take to be matter, and not an idea." ;My central interpretive thesis is about what the "immediacy" of perception consists in for Reid. I distinguish two options: the no intermediary thesis, and the no analysis thesis. The first option takes the immediacy of perception to consist in the absence of intermediate objects of thought in perception. The second option takes the immediacy of perception to consist in the absence of an analysis of the object-directedness of perceptual thought. I argue for the second interpretive option. ;I support my interpretation by showing that it offers the most textually and philosophically satisfying solution to a problem in Reid's thought. I first establish that Reid's thought has the problem my interpretation solves, which requires a comprehensive and, in places, controversial interpretation of Reid's overall account of perception. I then explain how the no analysis thesis develops a remark Reid himself makes when he confronts the problem, and provides a solution which is textually and philosophically superior to the alternatives. ;On my interpretation Reid's version of direct realism accommodates the involvement of phenomenal objects in perception. This makes my interpretation novel and Reid's direct realism a position of abiding philosophical interest, as I explain in the course of supporting my interpretation