Identity, psychological continuity, and rationality

Journal of Philosophical Research 18:15-24 (1993)
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Abstract

Derek Parfit claims that all that rationally matters for a person is psychological connectedness or continuity, even without identity. A psychological replica of a person whose body is destroyed upon the replication rationally should be considered just as valuable as the original person. I argue against this, maintaining that any such copying procedure would be objectionable. First, I argue that a copy of an original person does not preserve identity to the original person. And second, I argue that because a copy does not retain the identity of the orignial, it is not irrational to regard a copy as of less value than the original

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