Personal respect, private property, and market economy: What critical theory can learn from Hegel [Book Review]

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (5):573 - 586 (2008)
The aim of the present paper is to show that Hegel’s concept of personal respect is of great interest to contemporary Critical Theory. The author first analyzes this notion as it appears in the Philosophy of Right and then offers a new interpretation of the conceptual relation between personal respect and the institutions of (private) property and (capitalist) markets. In doing so, he shows why Hegel’s concept of personal respect allows us to understand markets as possible institutionalizations of this kind of recognition, and why it is compatible with a critique of neoliberal capitalism. He argues that due to these features Hegel’s notion of personal respect is of great interest to theoreticians within the tradition of critical theory.
Keywords Critical Theory  Economics  Hegel  Freedom  Personality  Property  Recognition
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