The Indispensability Argument for Mathematical Realism and Scientific Realism

Abstract
Confirmational holism is central to a traditional formulation of the indispensability argument for mathematical realism (IA). I argue that recent strategies for defending scientific realism are incompatible with confirmational holism. Thus a traditional formulation of IA is incompatible with recent strategies for defending scientific realism. As a consequence a traditional formulation of IA will only have limited appeal
Keywords Indispensability  Scientific realism  Confirmational holism
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    Anjan Chakravartty (1998). Semirealism. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 29 (3):391-408.

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    Mark Colyvan (1998). In Defence of Indispensability. Philosophia Mathematica 6 (1):39-62.
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