Albert Einstein Meets David Lewis

Abstract
I reject Norton and Earman's hole argument that spacetime substantivalism is incompatible with determinism. I reconcile these both technically and philosophically. There is a technical definition of determinism that is not violated by pairs of models of the kind used in the hole argument. And technicalities aside, the basic idea of determinism is not violated if we claim that at most one of the two models represents a possible world. This claim can be justified either by metrical essentialism (advocated by Maudlin), or by denying transworld identity for points: I prefer the latter.
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    Shamik Dasgupta (2011). The Bare Necessities. Philosophical Perspectives 25 (1):115-160.
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    Gordon Belot (1995). New Work for Counterpart Theorists: Determinism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (2):185-195.
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