David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Are these different requirements, in the sense that someone could satisfy one without satisfying the other? No one could meet the Truth Requirement without meeting the Variation Requirement, because understanding that a belief is false involves realising one should not believe it and appreciating the possibility of having other beliefs in its place. But could someone meet the Variation Requirement without meeting the Truth Requirement? In other words, is it possible to be aware of beliefs which are inconsistent without being aware that at least one of these beliefs is false?
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