"Counting As" a Bridge Principle: Against Searle Against Social-Scientific Laws

Philosophy of the Social Sciences 41 (4):455-469 (2011)
Abstract
John Searle’s argument that social-scientific laws are impossible depends on a special open-ended feature of social kinds. We demonstrate that under a noncontentious understanding of bridging principles the so-called "counts-as" relation, found in the expression "X counts as Y in (context) C," provides a bridging principle for social kinds. If we are correct, not only are social-scientific laws possible, but the "counts as" relation might provide a more perspicuous formulation for candidate bridge principles.
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DOI 10.1177/0048393110379859
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