David Lewis meets John bell

Philosophy of Science 59 (1):26-43 (1992)
The violation of the Bell inequality means that measurement-results in the two wings of the experiment cannot be screened off from one another, in the sense of Reichenbach. But does this mean that there is causation between the results? I argue that it does, according to Lewis's counterfactual analysis of causation and his associated views. The reason lies in his doctrine that chances evolve by conditionalization on intervening history. This doctrine collapses the distinction between the conditional probabilities that are used to state screening off, and the counterfactuals with chance consequents that are used to state lack of causation. I briefly discuss ways to evade my argument
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DOI 10.1086/289652
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John Earman & Giovanni Valente (2014). Relativistic Causality in Algebraic Quantum Field Theory. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 28 (1):1-48.
Simon Friederich (2013). In Defence of Non-Ontic Accounts of Quantum States. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 44 (2):77-92.
Michael Dickson (1993). Stapp's Theorem Without Counterfactual Commitments: Why It Fails Nonetheless. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 24 (5):791-814.

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