Emergence, Reduction and Supervenience: a Varied Landscape [Book Review]

This is one of two papers about emergence, reduction and supervenience. It expounds these notions and analyses the general relations between them. The companion paper analyses the situation in physics, especially limiting relations between physical theories. I shall take emergence as behaviour that is novel and robust relative to some comparison class. I shall take reduction as deduction using appropriate auxiliary definitions. And I shall take supervenience as a weakening of reduction, viz. to allow infinitely long definitions. The overall claim of this paper will be that emergence is logically independent both of reduction and of supervenience. In particular, one can have emergence with reduction, as well as without it; and emergence without supervenience, as well as with it. Of the subsidiary claims, the four main ones are: : I defend the traditional Nagelian conception of reduction ; : I deny that the multiple realizability argument causes trouble for reductions, or ``reductionism'' ; : I stress the collapse of supervenience into deduction via Beth's theorem ; : I adapt some examples already in the literature to show supervenience without emergence and vice versa.
Keywords Emergence  Reduction  Definitional extension  Nagel  Supervenience  Multiple realisability  Beth’s theorem
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DOI 10.1007/s10701-011-9549-0
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Citations of this work BETA
Karen Crowther (2015). Decoupling Emergence and Reduction in Physics. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 5 (3):419-445.
Dennis Dieks, Jeroen van Dongen & Sebastian de Haro (forthcoming). Emergence in Holographic Scenarios for Gravity. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics.
Daniele Oriti (2014). Disappearance and Emergence of Space and Time in Quantum Gravity. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 46 (2):186-199.

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Similar books and articles
Jaegwon Kim (2003). Supervenience, Emergence, Realization, Reduction. In Michael J. Loux & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics. Oxford University Press
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Daniel A. Bonevac (1988). Supervenience and Ontology. American Philosophical Quarterly 25 (January):37-47.
Jaegwon Kim (1984). Concepts of Supervenience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 (December):153-76.
Brian P. McLaughlin (1995). Varieties of Supervenience. In Elias E. Savellos & U. Yalcin (eds.), Supervenience: New Essays. Cambridge University Press 16--59.
Paul W. Humphreys (1997). Emergence, Not Supervenience. Philosophy of Science Supplement 64 (4):337-45.
Brian P. McLaughlin (1994). Varieties of Supervenience. In Elias E. Savellos & Ümit D. Yalçin (eds.), Savellos, E.; Yalchin, O. (Eds.) Supervenience. Cambridge University Press 16--59.
James van Cleve (1990). Mind -- Dust or Magic? Panpsychism Versus Emergence. Philosophical Perspectives 4:215-226.

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