David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Foundations of Physics 41 (6):920-959 (2011)
This is one of two papers about emergence, reduction and supervenience. It expounds these notions and analyses the general relations between them. The companion paper analyses the situation in physics, especially limiting relations between physical theories.I shall take emergence as behaviour that is novel and robust relative to some comparison class. I shall take reduction as deduction using appropriate auxiliary definitions. And I shall take supervenience as a weakening of reduction, viz. to allow infinitely long definitions.The overall claim of this paper will be that emergence is logically independent both of reduction and of supervenience. In particular, one can have emergence with reduction, as well as without it; and emergence without supervenience, as well as with it.Of the subsidiary claims, the four main ones (each shared with some other authors) are: I defend the traditional Nagelian conception of reduction (Sect. 3);I deny that the multiple realisability argument causes trouble for reductions, or “reductionism” (Sect. 4);I stress the collapse of supervenience into deduction via Beth’s theorem (Sect. 5.1);I adapt some examples already in the literature to show supervenience without emergence and vice versa (Sect. 5.2)
|Keywords||Emergence Reduction Definitional extension Nagel Supervenience Multiple realisability Beth’s theorem|
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References found in this work BETA
Robert W. Batterman (1992). Explanatory Instability. Noûs 26 (3):325-348.
Robert W. Batterman (2002). The Devil in the Details: Asymptotic Reasoning in Explanation, Reduction, and Emergence. Oxford University Press.
George Boolos, John Burgess, Richard P. & C. Jeffrey (2007). Computability and Logic. Cambridge University Press.
Jeremy Butterfield (1998). Quantum Curiosities of Psychophysics. In J. Cornwell (ed.), Consciousness and Human Identity. Oxford University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
Karen Crowther (2013). Emergent Spacetime According to Effective Field Theory: From Top-Down and Bottom-Up. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 44 (3):321-328.
Michael Silberstein (2012). Emergence and Reduction in Context: Philosophy of Science and/or Analytic Metaphysics. [REVIEW] Metascience 21 (3):627-642.
Eleanor Knox (2013). Effective Spacetime Geometry. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 44 (3):346-356.
Karen Crowther & Dean Rickles (2014). Introduction: Principles of Quantum Gravity. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 46:135-141.
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Ansgar Beckermann (1992). Supervenience, Emergence, and Reduction. In Ansgar Beckermann, Hans Flohr & Jaegwon Kim (eds.), Emergence or Reduction?: Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism. De Gruyter. 94--118.
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