David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 165 (3):841-863 (2013)
Could interacting mindreaders be in a position to know things which they would be unable to know if they were manifestly passive observers? This paper argues that they could. Mindreading is sometimes reciprocal: the mindreader’s target reciprocates by taking the mindreader as a target for mindreading. The paper explains how such reciprocity can significantly narrow the range of possible interpretations of behaviour where mindreaders are, or appear to be, in a position to interact. A consequence is that revisions and extensions are needed to standard theories of the evidential basis of mindreading. The view also has consequences for understanding how abilities to interact combined with comparatively simple forms of mindreading may explain the emergence, in evolution or development, of sophisticated forms of social cognition
|Keywords||Mindreading Theory of mind Joint action Interpretation Goal ascription Interaction Social cognition|
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Citations of this work BETA
Mattia Gallotti & Chris Frith (2013). Social Cognition in the We-Mode. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 17 (4):160-165.
William E. S. McNeill (2015). Inferentialism and Our Knowledge of Others’ Minds. Philosophical Studies 172 (6):1435-1454.
Thomas Szanto & Dermot Moran (forthcoming). Introduction: Empathy and Collective Intentionality—The Social Philosophy of Edith Stein. Human Studies:1-17.
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