Graduate studies at Western
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (3):126 - 127 (2011)
|Abstract||It is consistent with the evidence in The Origin of Concepts to conjecture that infants' causal representations, like their numerical representations, are not continuous with adults', so that bootstrapping is needed in both cases|
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