Meaning and metaphysics in the moral realism debate

Southern Journal of Philosophy 26 (1):9-27 (1988)
Semantic formulations of various moral realisms and nonrealisms are to be categorized not only by their differing metaphysical commitments, e.g., realism's rejection of relativism, dummett's antirealism and nihilism, but also by certain of their linguistic commitments. relevant linguistic commitments involve giving priority in the explanation of moral language to, variously, reference, truth conditions, inferential role or illocutionary force. the latter two are illustrated, respectively, by a social pragmatism resembling rorty's and a noncognitivism such as hare's
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DOI 10.1111/j.2041-6962.1988.tb01661.x
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