Graduate studies at Western
Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (1):31-56 (2007)
|Abstract||This paper presents arguments against two crucial elements of recent versions of the Two-Worlds interpretation of Plato. I argue first that in addition to knowledge of the forms, Plato allows beliefs about them as well. Then I argue that Plato sees knowledge as a state in which the subject is conscious of information about the forms. Thus, the infallibility of knowledge must be understood in a way that is consistent with its being informational. Finally, I argue that my conclusions about knowledge do not preclude the possibility that cognition of forms has a direct, nonrepresentational aspect|
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