Skepticism About the External World

New York: Oxford University Press (1998)
Abstract
One of the most important and perennially debated philosophical questions is whether we can have knowledge of the external world. Butchvarov here considers whether and how skepticism with regard to such knowledge can be refuted or at least answered. He argues that only a direct realist view of perception has any hope of providing a compelling response to the skeptic and introduces the radical innovation that the direct object of perceptual, and even dreaming and hallucinatory, experience is always a material object, but not necessarily one that actually exists. This leads him to a metaphysics in which reality is ultimately constructed by human decisions out of objects that are ontologically more basic but which cannot be said in themselves to be either real or unreal
Keywords Adverbs  Epistemology  External  Illusion  Language  Metaphysics  Realism  Reality  Scepticism  World
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Call number BD220.B87 1998
ISBN(s) 0195117190   9780195117196
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