Spotty Scope and Our Relation to Fictions

Noûs 46 (2):243-58 (2012)
Abstract
Whatever the attractions of Tolkein's world, irrealists about fictions do not believe literally that Bilbo Baggins is a hobbit. Instead, irrealists believe that, according to The Lord of the Rings {Bilbo is a hobbit}. But when irrealists want to say something like “I am taller than Bilbo”, there is nowhere good for them to insert the operator “according to The Lord of the Rings”. This is an instance of the operator problem. In this paper, I outline and criticise Sainsbury's (2006) spotty scope approach to the operator problem. Sainsbury treats the problem as syntactic, but the problem is ultimately metaphysical
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References found in this work BETA
P. T. Geach (1967). Intentional Identity. Journal of Philosophy 64 (20):627-632.
Jaakko Hintikka (1968). Language-Games for Quantifiers. In Nicholas Rescher (ed.), Studies in Logical Theory. Basil Blackwell. 46--72.

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