David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Analysis 66 (290):130–135 (2006)
No-futurists ('growing block theorists') hold that that the past and the present are real, but that the future is not. The present moment is therefore privileged: it is the last moment of time. Craig Bourne (2002) and David Braddon-Mitchell (2004) have argued that this position is unmotivated, since the privilege of presentness comes apart from the indexicality of 'this moment'. I respond that no-futurists should treat 'x is real-as-of y' as a nonsymmetric relation. Then different moments are real-as-of different times. This reunites privilege with indexicality, but entails that no-futurists must believe in ineliminably tensed facts.
|Keywords||No-futurism Growing block Hybrid views of time|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
C. Bourne (2002). When Am I? A Tense Time for Some Tense Theorists? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (3):359 – 371.
David Braddon-Mitchell (2004). How Do We Know It is Now Now? Analysis 64 (3):199–203.
Michael Dummett (1960). A Defense of Mctaggart's Proof of the Unreality of Time. Philosophical Review 69 (4):497-504.
Peter Forrest (2004). The Real but Dead Past: A Reply to Braddon-Mitchell. Analysis 64 (4):358–362.
E. Lowe (1998). Tense and Persistence. In Robin Le~Poidevin (ed.), Questions of Time and Tense. Oxford University Press. 43--59.
Citations of this work BETA
Tim Button (2007). Every Now and Then, No-Futurism Faces No Sceptical Problems. Analysis 67 (296):325–332.
Jonathan Tallant (2011). There's No Future in No-Futurism. Erkenntnis 74 (1):37-52.
Jonathan Tallant (2014). Defining Existence Presentism. Erkenntnis 79 (3):479-501.
Jonathan Tallant (2007). There Have Been, Are (Now), and Will Be Lots of Times Like the Present in the Hybrid View of Time. Analysis 67 (1):83–86.
Davide Rizza (2010). Discernibility by Symmetries. Studia Logica 96 (2):175 - 192.
Similar books and articles
Klaus Held (2007). Phenomenology of 'Authentic Time' in Husserl and Heidegger. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15 (3):327 – 347.
Alexander R. Pruss (2011). The A-Theory of Time and Induction. Philosophical Studies 152 (3):335 - 345.
Thomas M. Crisp & Donald P. Smith (2005). 'Wholly Present' Defined. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):318–344.
William Craig (2000). The Extent of the Present. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 14 (2):165 – 185.
Bradford Skow (2012). Why Does Time Pass? Noûs 46 (2):223-242.
Sean Enda Power (2012). The Metaphysics of the 'Specious' Present. Erkenntnis 77 (1):121-132.
Stephen David Ross (2010). Re-Membering. International Studies in Philosophy Monograph Series:43-59.
Tydings Hall, Honors 229F The Problem of Time: Puzzles About Time in Philosophy, Literature, and Film TuTh 11-12:15.
Steven D. Hales (2010). No Time Travel for Presentists. Logos and Episteme 1 (2):353-360.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads65 ( #24,511 of 1,100,104 )
Recent downloads (6 months)15 ( #14,477 of 1,100,104 )
How can I increase my downloads?