Graduate studies at Western
Philosophia 40 (4):771-782 (2012)
|Abstract||Abstract I argue that the two primary motivations in the literature for positing seemings as sui generis mental states are insufficient to motivate this view. Because of this, epistemological views which attempt to put seemings to work don’t go far enough. It would be better to do the same work by appealing to what makes seeming talk true rather than simply appealing to seeming talk. Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-12 DOI 10.1007/s11406-012-9363-8 Authors T. Ryan Byerly, Department of Philosophy, Baylor University, Waco, TX, USA Journal Philosophia Online ISSN 1574-9274 Print ISSN 0048-3893|
|Keywords||Seemings Phenomenal conservatism Experiences Inclinations|
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