Online research in philosophy

A fundamental ingredient in Kierkegaard's conception of the self is the idea that ?the self is a relation which relates itself to its own self?. Kierkegaard makes much of this, and understanding the idea furnishes the reader with a key to the interpretation of central themes in his writings. It can also inform and enrich more modern versions of the same idea. For my own part I have found in Kierkegaard's conception a source of insights concerning a notion of the self that is articulated in action?theoretical terms. In this paper I shall first delineate this notion, without references to Kierkegaard; and then, when the notion has been introduced, in outline, I shall bring in some of Kierkegaard's ideas in The Sickness unto Death (SuD). I hope thereby to illustrate one way in which I think Kierkegaard can be seen as a contributor to a field in development, namely the study of the self.

A fundamental ingredient in Kierkegaard's conception of the self is the idea that 'the self is a relation which relates itself to its own self'. Kierkegaard makes much of this, and understanding the idea furnishes the reader with a key to the interpretation of central themes in his writings. It can also inform and enrich more modern versions of the same idea. For my own part I have found in Kierkegaard's conception a source of insights concerning a notion of the self that is articulated in action-theoretical terms. In this paper I shall first delineate this notion, without references to Kierkegaard; and then, when the notion has been introduced, in outline, I shall bring in some of Kierkegaard's ideas in The Sickness unto Death (SuD) . I hope thereby to illustrate one way in which I think Kierkegaard can be seen as a contributor to a field in development, namely the study of the self.

The literature on Kierkegaard is often content to paraphrase. By contrast, Michael Theunissen articulates one of Kierkegaard's central ideas, his theory of despair, in a detailed and comprehensible manner and confronts it with alternatives. Understanding what Kierkegaard wrote on despair is vital not only because it illuminates his thought as a whole, but because his account of despair in The Sickness unto Death is the cornerstone of existentialism. Theunissen's book, published in German in 1993, is widely regarded as the best treatment of the subject in any language. Kierkegaard's Concept of Despair is also one of the few works on Kierkegaard that bridge the gap between the Continental and analytic traditions in philosophy. Theunissen argues that for Kierkegaard, the fundamental characteristic of despair is the desire of the self "not to be what it is." He sorts through the apparently chaotic text of The Sickness unto Death to explain what Kierkegaard meant by the "self," how and why individuals want to flee their selves, and how he believed they could reconnect with their selves. According to Theunissen, Kierkegaard thought that individuals in despair seek to deny their authentic selves to flee particular aspects of their character, their past, or the world, or in order to deny their "mission." In addition to articulating and evaluating Kierkegaard's concept of despair, Theunissen relates Kierkegaard's ideas to those of Heidegger, Sartre, and other twentieth-century philosophers.

Kierkegaard, described by Wittgenstein as "by far the most profound thinker of the [nineteenth] century," has influenced a wide range of philosophers and theologians. Fear and Trembling , which investigates the nature of faith and its relation to ethics via a discussion of the story of Abraham and Isaac, is one of Kierkegaard's most compelling and popular works. Kierkegaard and Fear and Trembling introduces and assesses: * Kierkegaard's life and the background to Fear and Trembling * The ideas and text of Fear and Trembling , possibly his most famous work * Kierkegaard's continuing importance in philosophy.

This paper explores Kierkegaard's encounter with the work of Arthur Schopenhauer, as recorded in a series of journal entries from mid-1854. Kierkegaard finds in Schopenhauer both an uncannily similar authorial voice to his own, and a cautionary picture of the failure of authorial integrity. By critiquing Schopenhauer's failure to inhabit his own philosophical categories, Kierkegaard reflexively sharpens his own conception of what his authorial project demands.

: What is truly beautiful? For Søren Kierkegaard the beautiful is to be found in an integrated self, one that is freely chosen. This article explores Kierkegaard's "aesthetic" stage of existence through the character of Augusto Pérez, the protagonist of Miguel de Unamuno's novel, Niebla. After establishing a solid link between Unamuno and Kierkegaard, Kierkegaard's "ethical" stage is used to critique the "aesthetic" stage on aesthetic grounds, on the basis of the beauty found in life's work, a calling. The conclusion is that the sphere of the "aesthetic" does not achieve Kierkegaard's "aesthetics" of an integrated, fully existing self.

Kierkegaard and Philosophy makes many of the most important papers on Kierkegaard available in one place for the first time. These seventeen essays, written over a period of over twenty years, have all been substantially revised or specially prepared for this collection, with a new introduction by the author. In the first part, Alastair Hannay concentrates on Kierkegaard's central philosophical writings, offering closely text-based accounts of the slient concepts Kierkegaard uses. The second part shows the relevance of other thinkers' treatments of shared themes, pointing our where they differ from Kierkegaard. The concluding chapter provides a reason Kierkegaard himself would give for disagreeing with those who claim his texts are infinitely interpretable. Written by the world's foremost Kierkegaard scholar and translator, Kierkegaard and Philosophy is an indispensible resource for all students of Kierkegaard's work.

Søren Kierkegaard's thesis, "The Concept of Irony", contains an interesting critique of pure irony. Kierkegaard's critique turns on two main claims: (a) pure irony is an incoherent and thus, unrealizable stance; (b) the pursuit of pure irony is morally enervating, psychologically destructive, and culminates in bondage to moods. In this essay, first I attempt to clarify Kierkegaard's understanding of pure irony as "infinite absolute negativity." Then I set forth his multilayered critique of pure irony. Finally, I consider briefly a distinctly theological component in Kierkegaard's critique. I argue that this feature of Kierkegaard's account can and should be distinguished from the broadly ethical critique of pure irony that I sketch in the second section, even if these components of Kierkegaard's position are found together as a unified whole in "The Concept of Irony". My overall goal in this essay is to reveal the subtlety and plausibility of Kierkegaard's critique of pure irony. I also attempt to disclose the richness of the Hegelian account of ethical life to which Kierkegaard recurs in his thesis.

Philosophically, Søren Kierkegaard was the “bridge” that led from Hegel to Existentialism. Kierkegaard abhorred Hegel’s abstract, know-it-all idealism that tried to capture reality in a few words. Kierkegaard’s attack on social and religious complacency and his single-handed assault on traditional Western philosophy generated a crisis that produced a radically new way of philosophizing and made him the founder of the school that would later be called Existentialism. To Kierkegaard, reality was personal, subjective–it began and ended with the individual–and philosophy was not something one merely talked about, it was the way you lived. Kierkegaard For Beginners explains, plainly and simply, the great Danish thinker’s obsession with the particularity of human existence as well as his demonstration of how the creation of an authentic new kind of individual is possible.

Several commentators on Kierkegaard and Heidegger have noted the similarity between Heidegger's account of authentic temporality in Being and Time and Kierkegaard's discussion of time in The Concept of Dread. By drawing attention to a not very well known essay of Kierkegaard's, ?The Decisiveness of Death?, I attempt to show that there is a very close connection between Heidegger's and Kierkegaard's entire views on authentic human existence. In the second part I try to locate in The Present Age, not just the equivalent of das Man in Heidegger as numerous commentators have done, but the presence of the entire temporal structure of inauthenticity with equivalents for each of the ?fallen? modes of inauthentic being described by Heidegger in Being and Time. The result is that the previous attempts by commentators to restrict early Heidegger's originality vis?à?vis Kierkegaard begin to look like masterpieces of understatement. In the process of reaching this conclusion I try to shed light on several often misunderstood aspects of Kierkegaard's thought.