Philosophical Studies 135 (3):335 - 362 (2007)
|Abstract||This paper argues that we can benefit or harm people by creating them, but only in the sense that we can create things that are good or bad for them. What we cannot do is to confer comparative benefits and harms to people by creating them or failing to create them. You are not better off (or worse off) created than you would have been had you not been created, for nothing has value for you if you do not exist, not even neutral value.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||No categories specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
David Benatar (2001). To Be or Not to Have Been? International Journal of Applied Philosophy 15 (2):255-266.
Janet Malek (2007). Understanding Risks and Benefits in Research on Reproductive Genetic Technologies. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 32 (4):339 – 358.
Ben Novak (2008). Anselm on Nothing. International Philosophical Quarterly 48 (3):305-320.
Bruce Langtry (2008). God, the Best, and Evil. OUP Oxford.
Marc Fleurbaey, Bertil Tungodden & Peter Vallentyne (2009). On the Possibility of Nonaggregative Priority for the Worst Off. Social Philosophy and Policy 26 (1):258-285.
Caspar Hare (2009). The Ethics of Morphing. Philosophical Studies 145 (1):111 - 130.
David Benatar (2006). Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming Into Existence. New York ;Oxford University Press.
Nils Holtug (2001). On the Value of Coming Into Existence. Journal of Ethics 5 (4):361-384.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads65 ( #13,974 of 549,088 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #37,333 of 549,088 )
How can I increase my downloads?