Book reviews
British Journal of Aesthetics 33 (1) (1993)
| Abstract | correct insofar as he thinks Humeanism is committed to object transubstantia- tion. If the individual essences of objects are constituted only by intrinsic categorical properties, and it is possible for their dispositional properties to change without accompanying changes in their intrinsic categorical properties, then it would be possible for a particular object to remain the very same object even if its dispositions to behave changed radically. It is not clear, however, that scientific essentialism per se is not also committed to object transubstantiation. Scientific essentialism would preclude object transubstantiation if the kinds instantiated by an object were part of the individual essence of the object; for instance, if being a member of the substance kind human were essential to the individual Nixon. But Ellis specifically denies this claim; he asserts that “individual essences would seem to have very little to do with kind essences” (238–39). So once object transubstantiation is distinguished from kind transubstantiation, it is not clear how embarrassed the Humean should be. Neither scientific essentialism nor Humeanism per se is committed to kind transubstantiation. And though Humeanism is committed to object transubstantiation, scientific essentialism per se does not preclude object transubstantiation. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,679 |
| External links |
  Try with proxy. |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesJose Bermudez (2007). The Object Properties Model of Object Perception: Between the Binding Model and the Theoretical Model. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (s 9-10):43-65.
Neil E. Williams (2011). Putnam's Traditional Neo-Essentialism. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (242):151-170.
Arda Denkel (1996). Object and Property. Cambridge University Press.
L. A. Paul (2006). In Defense of Essentialism. Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):333–372.
Muhammad Ali Khalidi (2009). How Scientific is Scientific Essentialism? Journal for General Philosophy of Science 40 (1):85 - 101.
Alexander Bird (2009). Essences and Natural Kinds. In Robin Le Poidevin (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics. Routledge.
Achille Varzi (2000). Topological Essentialism. Philosophical Studies 100 (3):217 - 236.
Sonia Roca-Royes (2011). Essential Properties and Individual Essences. Philosophy Compass 6 (1):65-77.
Brandon Warmke (2010). Artifact and Essence. Philosophia 38 (3):595-614.
Analytics
Monthly downloads
Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
|
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads3 ( #201,837 of 549,070 )Recent downloads (6 months)0How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
