Consciousness and nonconceptual content [Book Review]
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 113 (3):261-274 (2003)
Consciousness, Color, and Content is a signiﬁcant contribution to our understanding of consciousness, among other things. I have learned a lot from it, as well as Tye’s other writings. What’s more, I actually agree with much of it – fortunately for this symposium, not all of it. The book continues the defense of the “PANIC” theory of phenomenal consciousness that Tye began in Ten Problems of Consciousness (1995). A fair chunk of it, though, is largely independent of this theory: the discussion of the knowledge argument, the explanatory gap, and color. Tye says much of interest about these topics. But as most of my disagreement is with the PANIC theory, I shall concentrate on that. The PANIC theory is nothing short of ambitious. It is a reductive account of phenomenal consciousness in intentional/functional terms. Tye further gives, at least in outline, a broadly physicalistic account of intentionality (a “naturalized semantics”), in terms of causal covariation. Putting the PANIC theory and Tye’s naturalized semantics together, the result is a physicalistically acceptable theory of phenomenal consciousness. The two parts of this package are independent. A naturalized semantics can be combined with dualism about consciousness (a position close to this is in Chalmers, 1996). And a PANIC theorist is at liberty to endorse a rival physicalistic theory of intentionality, or indeed could take intentionality to be entirely irreducible. The plan is this. Section 1 brieﬂy airs a concern about Tye’s naturalized semantics. The rest of the paper focuses on the PANIC theory, in particular the use it makes of “nonconceptual content”.1 Philosophical Studies 113: 261–274, 2003. © 2003 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands. 262..
|Keywords||Conceptualism Consciousness Content Metaphysics Phenomena Tye, M|
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Citations of this work BETA
David Bourget & Angela Mendelovici (2014). Tracking Representationalism. In Andrew Bailey (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: The Key Thinkers. Continuum 209-235.
David Bourget (2010). Consciousness is Underived Intentionality. Noûs 44 (1):32 - 58.
William E. Seager & David Bourget (2007). Representationalism About Consciousness. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell 261-276.
Adina L. Roskies (2008). A New Argument for Nonconceptual Content. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):633–659.
Josefa Toribio (2007). Nonconceptual Content. Philosophy Compass 2 (3):445–460.
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