Graduate studies at Western
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):641-65 (2003)
|Abstract||Anything is similar to anything, provided the respects of similarity are allowed to be gerrymandered or gruesome, as Goodman observed.2 But similarity in non-gruesome or—as I shall say—genuine respects is much less ecumenical. Colors, it seems, provide a compelling illustration of the distinction as applied to similarities among properties.3 For instance, in innumerable gruesome respects, blue is more similar to yellow than to purple. But in a genuine respect, blue is more similar to purple than to yellow (genuinely more similar, as I shall sometimes put it)|
|Keywords||Color Epistemology Perception Similarity Kripke, S Lewis, D Walker, R|
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