David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):641-65 (2003)
Anything is similar to anything, provided the respects of similarity are allowed to be gerrymandered or gruesome, as Goodman observed.2 But similarity in non-gruesome or—as I shall say—genuine respects is much less ecumenical. Colors, it seems, provide a compelling illustration of the distinction as applied to similarities among properties.3 For instance, in innumerable gruesome respects, blue is more similar to yellow than to purple. But in a genuine respect, blue is more similar to purple than to yellow (genuinely more similar, as I shall sometimes put it)
|Keywords||Color Epistemology Perception Similarity Kripke, S Lewis, D Walker, R|
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David Malet Armstrong (1978). A Theory of Universals. Universals and Scientific Realism Volume Ii. Cambridge University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
Nicholas Silins (2013). The Significance of High-Level Content. Philosophical Studies 162 (1):13-33.
Pär Sundström (2007). Colour and Consciousness: Untying the Metaphysical Knot. Philosophical Studies 136 (2):123 - 165.
Robert Schroer (2010). Where's the Beef? Phenomenal Concepts as Both Demonstrative and Substantial. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):505-522.
Adam Pautz (2006). Can the Physicalist Explain Colour Structure in Terms of Colour Experience? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):535 – 564.
Joshua Gert (2006). A Realistic Colour Realism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):565 – 589.
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