Color and similarity

Anything is similar to anything, provided the respects of similarity are allowed to be gerrymandered or gruesome, as Goodman observed.2 But similarity in non-gruesome or—as I shall say—genuine respects is much less ecumenical. Colors, it seems, provide a compelling illustration of the distinction as applied to similarities among properties.3 For instance, in innumerable gruesome respects, blue is more similar to yellow than to purple. But in a genuine respect, blue is more similar to purple than to yellow (genuinely more similar, as I shall sometimes put it).
Keywords Color  Epistemology  Perception  Similarity  Kripke, S  Lewis, D  Walker, R
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2003.tb00282.x
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 15,831
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
John McDowell (1994). Mind and World. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

View all 48 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Adam Pautz (2007). Intentionalism and Perceptual Presence. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):495-541.
Hagit Benbaji (forthcoming). Why Colour Primitivism? Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-23.

View all 10 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

67 ( #47,948 of 1,724,748 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

14 ( #50,612 of 1,724,748 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.