Causation, randomness, and pseudo-randomness in John Venn'slogic of chance

History and Philosophy of Logic 26 (4):299-319 (2005)
In 1866, the young John Venn published The Logic of Chance, motivated largely by the desire to correct what he saw as deep fallacies in the reasoning of historical determinists such as Henry Buckle and in the optimistic heralding of a true social science by Adolphe Quetelet. Venn accepted the inevitable determinism implied by the physical sciences, but denied that the stable social statistics cited by Buckle and Quetelet implied a similar determinism in human actions. Venn maintained that probability statements were intelligible solely as projections of the ultimate frequency of an outcome in an unlimited series of trials and therefore led to no inferences about free will. An issue here was Venn's claim that although the aggregate probability may be stable, the individual events were completely irregular and, in fact, displayed randomness. Venn's concept of randomness was really apparent, or pseudo-, randomness, which could be totally determined. Ironically, Venn's frequentist position was very useful to the growing field of statistics, which could develop correlations and predictive models empirically without having to address implications for personal freedom or fatalism
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DOI 10.1080/01445340500260816
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References found in this work BETA
Ian Hacking (1990). The Taming of Chance. Cambridge University Press.
Peter J. Bowler (1985). Evolution: The History of an Idea. Journal of the History of Biology 18 (1):155-157.
Antony Eagle (2005). Randomness Is Unpredictability. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (4):749-790.

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Citations of this work BETA
Byron E. Wall (2006). John Venn's Opposition to Probability as Degree of Belief. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 37 (4):550-561.

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Similar books and articles
E. B. (1999). John Venn's Evolutionary Logic of Chance. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 30 (4):559-585.
Antony Eagle (2005). Randomness Is Unpredictability. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (4):749-790.
Roman Frigg (2006). The Ergodic Hierarchy, Randomness and Hamiltonian Chaos. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 37 (4):661-691.
Antony Eagle (2010). Chance Versus Randomness. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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