|Abstract||The primary issues concern whether objects have colours, and what sorts of properties the colours are. Some philosophers hold that nothing is coloured, others that colour are powers to affect perceivers, and others that colours are physical properties.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Only published papers are available at libraries|
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